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American Federalism, State Governments,
and Public Policy: Weaving Together
Loose Theoretical Threads
Dale Krane, The University of Nebraska at Omaha
Decisions about the provision and
delivery of public goods and services
take place within the framework
established by America's most distinctive political invention-federalism. Author after author reminds
students and scholars alike that
policy making can be understood
only from an intergovernmental perspective. But to use a term such as
''intergovernmental policy making''
thrusts one into two distinctive
analytic worlds which, at best, are
loosely woven together.
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Many conventional models of
policy making give little place to federal arrangements or to the factors
that sustain American federalism.
Equally problematic, efforts to
model federalism often do not take
advantage of the conceptually more
developed policy making literature.
An unfortunate consequence of this
"separateness" is the regular appearance of policy studies with hypotheses or conclusions that could have
been easily explained or predicted
had the author been more familiar

with the corpus of work available
on American federalism.
Compounding this lack of conceptual integration between federalism and policy-making studies is the
continuing tendency to downplay or
even ignore the activities and influence of state governments. To use
states as an observational unit of
analysis is not the same as granting
state governments the explanatory
status of a "structural variable"
(Scheuch 1969; Ragin 1987).
Although information about states
PS: Political Science & Politics
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comprises the data bases for numerous intergovernmental and policy
analyses, nevertheless, states are not
accorded an explanatory role commensurate with their: impact on
public policy.
The two essays on public policy
analysis by Susan Hansen and on
federalism by David Beam et al. in
Political Science: The State of the
Discipline (Finifter 1983) confirm the
striking separation of federalism/
intergovernmental relations from
policy analysis. For example, Hansen
(239) in her conclusion notes that the
distinctive contribution political scientists can play in policy analysis, in
contrast to that of economists, is
" ... to pose questions about administrative effectiveness or organizational structures .... " But Hansen's
review of the development of policy
studies demonstrates that models of
the policy process up to 1983 did little to incorporate federal features or
state governments as explanatory
variables. Beam and his co-authors
(271) acknowledge the atheoretical
character of federalism studies. To
improve theorizing about federalism,
they recommend a strategy which
includes " ... a fuller recognition
that the national government now
depends very heavily upon state and
local governments. . . . '' They go on
to note "the need to link . . . "
policy studies to federalism research.

"Forgotten Federalism"
Hamilton and Wells (1990, 1)
unabashedly declare that "federalism
is simply too often forgotten." A
quick perusal of common public
policy textbooks confirms their
assessment. While not "forgetting"
federalism completely, policy textbooks pay brief homage to America's
federal government. Federalism is
depicted as a contextual feature
which conditions the behavior of
individuals and groups, typically
expressed as "federalism disperses
power" or ". . . permits policy
diversity." This ritualistic recognition
of federalism includes some combination of the following topics:
reasons for federalism, historical
eras, the grant system, and the complications for policy makers. Seldom
are students presented with a con-
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ceptual framework or a model that
links the components of federal organization to the formulation, adoption, or implementation of policy. By
forgetting the considerable body of
writing on American federalism,
policy analysts continue to produce
research findings that could have
been easily explained or derived from
the intergovernmental literature.
For too long as well, federalism
scholars have contributed to the
neglect of intergovernmental aspects
in policy modeling. Inability to make
progress on ending the theoretical
weakness of federal studies has not
prompted others to turn to the subfield for useful concepts. Second, the
short supply of detailed information,
other than fiscal information, about
many aspects of state and local government make it difficult to discover
cross-state or cross-level patterns. In
some cases, it is easier to engage in
cross-national research than it is to
do comparative state or intergovernmental research. Third, the methodological and cost challenges of conducting research across several states,
as exemplified by the field network
strategy, require substantial
resources.

Models of Policy Formulation
Of course, the manner and the
degree to which federalism/intergovernmental relations intertwine
with policy making depends on the
phase of the policy process one has
under consideration. Widely accepted
models of policy formulation such as
iron triangles, issue networks, and
agenda-building offer scant reference
to federal arrangements or to the
diversity of subnational cultures and
place-based interests that dynamically
support and are sustained by American federalism. PIGs, or intergovernmental lobbies, are categorized as
just one more interest group in the
"policy soup." Certainly, states and
localities behave as pressure groups;
but their constitutional status empowers them with legitimate authority not exercised by other types of
groups as well as institutional access
not available to other interests.
With so many competing policy
models, it is only natural that some

conceptual devices do a better
explanatory job than others. Iron triangles, for example, offer little
heuristic value in explaining specific
instances of state officials derailing
presidential initiatives, such as the
National Governors Association's
bipartisan resistance that doomed
Reagan's "turnback and swap" proposal to devolve programs to the
states. On the other hand, diffusion
of innovation models offers clear
insights into the growing influence of
state policy initiatives that arrive on
the national agenda and are ultimately adopted (e.g., education reform,
environmental protection, health
care, and "workfare").
Even agenda-setting models, probably the most sophisticated framework for exploring policy formulation, downplay the impact of the
federal matrix. State government
officials, because of their place in
American federalism, have a number
of doors, not just windows, into the
larger national policy process. Wright
(1988, 275) identified nine issue areas
in which governors can work to
shape national policy. Governors also
possess a freedom of action that
encompasses personal contact with
presidents, strategy sessions with
their state congressional delegation,
negotiations with federal administrators, and mobilization of public
opinion in their home state and
throughout the nation.
Other state government officials
also possess the capacity and
resources by which to influence
national policy (see Krane 1993). A
covert example of state power over
national policy can be found in the
1991 reports from state capitals that
state legislators were using the decennial process of redrawing congressional districts as a bargaining chip
to extract policy promises from congressional incumbents. The point
here is simple: policy models that
assign federalism to a contextual role
which only creates complications or
obstacles to action miss the fundamental fact that subnational officials
are actors whose preferences embody
the interests of a particular jurisdiction. Put more simply, American federalism is more than a maze of institutions; it is a matrix of reciprocal
power relations.
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Models of
Policy Implementation
Although implementation research
from its earliest beginnings acknowledged the intergovernmental dimensions of the policy process, the role
of state governments in policy implementation models has been cast in a
curiously emasculated fashion. For
example, top-down models view implementation as a rational-technical
process of assembling the necessary
elements needed to penetrate through
"bureaucratic-political" layers to the
policy's target beneficiaries. Successful top-down implementation
depends on marshalling enough
resources (money, trained personnel,
facilities) to overcome the complexity
of joint action, provided the national
policy goals are sufficiently clear.
The conceptual keys to implementation are three: the tractability of the
problem, the capacity built into the
statute, and the prevailing contextual
conditions. Little acknowledgement is
given, for example, to "picket-fence
federalism" which as a description of
implementation pre-dates the topdown models, and even less recognition is given to the obvious point
that the multi-layered, multi-actor
"picket-fence" creates the necessity
to infuse policies with enough capacity to overcome the complexity of
joint action (e.g., sufficient funds
with which to purchase compliance
from reluctant states).
Bottom-up models stress the
potential for deflection or distortion
of national policy by local authorities. The encounter of street-level
bureaucrats with program clients is
reputed to be the defining moment
that actualizes the policy mandate.
Local action that is faithful to
national objectives serves as the
benchmark for successful bottom-up
implementation. While bottom-up
models recognize the autonomy
granted to subnational authorities by
federalism, these behavioral-realist
models sometimes so narrow their
conceptual focus as to obscure the
impact of state government on local
actions. For example, the administration of welfare programs over the
past twenty years has changed in
important ways as a result of state
government takeover of the old
county welfare office. This change in
188

turn affects the ability to integrate
welfare reform with education, training, and employment programs,
many of which remain locally based.
What is conceptually striking
about many implementation models
(of either direction) is the lack of
attention to two of the earliest and
best articulated frameworks, both of
which begin with the attributes of the
federal system. Pressman (1975)
developed a "donor-recipient"
model of the grant-in-aid process
that explicitly incorporated the interjurisdictional conflict, mutual dependence, and power asymmetry of
American federalism. Williams (1980)
set forth a "shared governance"
model of the "uneasy partnership"
within federal programs. Only with

American federalism is
more than a maze of
institutions; it is a matrix
of reciprocal power
relations.
the "third generation" of implementation studies has the capacity of
states and localities to act as "power
wielders" (Pressman's term) been
restored to the status of an explanatory variable.

A Resurgence of
State Governments as an
Explanatory Variable
Lack of attention to American federalism in explanations of public
policy may be coming to an end. The
post-1960 revitalization of state governments, the growing demands to
devolve public policy, and the
national government's own fiscal distress have thrust state governments
and American federalism back onto
the agenda of both policy makers
and model makers. Susan MacManus
(1991, 203-54), in her "Looking to
the Future" essay, cites figures that
indicate many members of the APSA
Organized Section on Federalism and
Intergovernmental Relations also
belong to another section, in particular public policy, public admin-

istration, urban politics, and law I
courts/judicial politics. MacManus
(212) goes on to review "new
theories and findings" about federalism and concludes that "the study of
federalism and intergovernmental
relations is now part of the political
science 'mainstream' " and "today
many researchers in our subfield are
among the profession's leading scholars and association leaders."
MacManus is correct in her assessment of federalism's return from the
conceptual wilderness. However, for
the renaissance in federalism studies
to continue, the loose weaving of
federalism with policy models must
be tightened. One can see the need
for transcending the treatment of
intergovernmental relations as a contextual variable in policy studies by
reviewing the changing fortunes of
American federalism in the premier
policy textbook.
If one revisits the first edition
(1972) of Thomas Dye's Understanding Public Policy, the widely used
and influential undergraduate textbook, one finds no mention of federalism or intergovernmental relations. There is, however, a chapter
devoted to "a systems analysis of
state policies.'' A separate chapter on
American federalism did not appear
until the fifth edition (1984) and its
historical (e.g., changes in federalism
from dual to cooperative) and descriptive (e.g., block versus categorical grants) treatment of federalism
carried over to the sixth edition
(1987). In the current seventh edition
(1992, 307-10) Dye has added, for
the first time, a section which
analyzes through the lens of public
choice theory the impact of intergovernmental competition on various
types of policy (also see Dye 1990).
No doubt this theoretical breakthrough is a harbinger of models to
come, but improved theorizing about
federalism also needs to be infused
into models of the policy process.
Other signs that the paths of federalism and policy studies may be
converging can be found in recent
scholarship. Jack Treadway (1985)
summarizes twenty years of the politics versus environment debate over
policy outputs and uses his critical
review to produce a model of the
state policy-making process that combines national and state level features
PS: Political Science & Politics
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(including state political culture).
Thomas Anton (1989, v) proposes a
"benefits coalition" framework to
explain how " ... the interrelationships among levels [of government]
that are the defining characteristics
of American public policies."
Robertson and Judd's (1989) policy
text adopts a "new institutionalism"
approach which emphasizes the independent role of government in the
policy making process. Paul Sabatier
(1991), in laying out some directions
for "better theories of the policy
process," describes three models,
each of which holds that government
institutions are a critical explanatory
variable for understanding public
policy.

Weaving Together
Loose Theoretical Threads
Research on American federalism,
state governments, and public policy
has produced two extensive fabrics of
information that demonstrate it is
possible to accumulate knowledge
without substantial synthesis. In
order to move toward more coherence and integration of federal
studies with policy analysis, a
number of epistemological problems
will have to be addressed. The list
offered here is not a complete itemization of the many sharp philosophical points that can snag the warp
and woof of theory; instead the
points raised here are illustrative of
the challenges of weaving together
the threads of different subfields.
One snag is the "combinedeffects" problem that is also encountered in the study of international
relations. Interaction between two (or
more) governments or organizations
requires (1) identification of the
internal and external factors that
account for phenomenon under study
and (2) determination of the relative
causal strength of each factor. These
"combined-effects" produce another
tangle: that of multiple units of
analysis. Both policy and federal
studies struggle with the linkage of
individuals and institutions, especially
when the boundaries of organizational or jurisdictional units are
"blurred." Third, the dynamics of
the policy process coupled with the
flux in federal institutions tear at
any static theory. To cope with
June 1993

change, an integrative model would
have to focus on activities which
shape institutions and policies over
time, such as decision making. A
fourth epistemological point that can
rip the fabric of theory is overreliance on a single type of information (e.g., fiscal data). Working with
a small number of data threads not
only diminishes the richness of the
theoretical pattern, but also reduces
its generalizability; that is to say, the
theoretical cloth produced will have
too many holes. 1
What kind of loom will weave
together the threads of federalism
and public policy? Over the last ten
years there has been a lessening of
the optimism that a theory of politics
can be constructed by ignoring political institutions (March and Olsen
1984). The "new institutionalism"
and the nascent theory of "policy
design" share a theoretical concern
with understanding the effects of different institutional structures on the
behavior of individuals. The search
for a "structural logic of policy"
which " ... will contribute to a more
refined understanding of the role of
institutional factors in policy design''
(Linder and Peters 1990, 103) closely
matches the message of the "new
institutionalism''-' 'the organization
of political life makes a difference."
Efforts to increase the complementarity of rational choice models with
institutional analysis appear to hold
great potential for avoiding many of
the snags to an integrative theory
(Ostrom 1991).
Only by weaving together the separate strands of federal studies with
policy analysis can instructors help
their students understand why
Martha Derthick (1992, 675), in
delivering the 1992 Gaus Lecture,
revealed that she was seriously thinking of petitioning a federal judge for
the right to vote in California. The
reason she offered for this secret
desire was her realization that in
many policy areas she was governed
by the state of California, even
though she lived in Virginia!

Note
I. The points raised in this paragraph
derive from the discussions of shortcomings
in political inquiry found in Gillespie and
Zinnes (1982), especially the essays by Judith
Gillespie, Brian Job, and J. Donald Moon.
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International and Comparative Federalism
Daniel J. Elazar, Bar Ilan University and Temple University

Federalism has become a major
issue in world affairs and consequently in political science after
many years of being ignored as a
proper subject for political study
except as intergovernmental relations
in specifically federal systems,
especially in the United States. Federalism should be understood both in
its narrower sense as intergovernmental relations and in its larger sense as
the combination of self-rule and
shared rule through constitutionalized power sharing in a noncentralized basis.
Initially, comparative studies of
federalism could be classified in three
general groupings:
(I) federalism in the Englishspeaking world, particularly the
British Empire, including imperial federalism (Davis 1978; King
1982; Wheare 1964);
(2) federalism in the Germanspeaking world, particularly Germany and Switzerland (Frenkel
1984; Esterbauer, Heraud and
Pernthaler 1977); and
(3) federalistic ideologies and
schemes, mostly presented by
philosophic advocates of federalism as a utopian system (Marc
1948; Marc and Aron 1948;
Stevens 1977).
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Federalism on the Agenda
It is increasingly clear that federalism itself, to use a biological analogy,
is a genus that includes several
species (Elazar 1987). One, federation, what most people today refer to
as federalism, is the form of government invented by the founding
fathers of the United States in the
Constitution of 1787 (Diamond 1959;
Ostrom 1986). It establishes a common general government in which to
form a polity, constituent units
both govern themselves and share
a common constitutional government of the whole. Powers are
delegated to the former by the people
of all the units. Its dissolution can
only come about through the consent
of all or a majority of its constituent
units. The general government has
direct access to every citizen and
supremacy in those areas in which it
is granted authority (Wheare 1953;
King 1982; Duchacek 1970). Archetypical modern federations include
the United States, Switzerland, and
Canada (Frenkel 1977; Smiley 1980).
A second, confederation, was the
accepted form of federalism prior to
1787. In a confederation, the constituent units form a union but retain
most sovereign and constituent
powers. They establish and maintain

continuous control over the general
government which must work
through them to reach the citizenry.
The secession of individual units may
be possible by prior constitutional
agreement without general consent.
Classic confederations include the
Greek Achaean League and the
United Provinces of the Netherlands.
The best modern example is the
European Community (Hughes 1963;
Elazar 1987; Elazar 1982).
A third species is federacy, an
asymmetrical relationship between a
federated state and a larger federate
power, providing for potential union
on the basis of the federated state
maintaining greater internal autonomy by foregoing certain forms of
participation in the governance of the
federate power. In the United States
this kind of arrangement is called
"commonwealth." Both Puerto Rico
and the Northern Marianas are federacies (Friedrich 1968; Elazar 1987).
A fourth species, associated statehood, is similar to federacy in the
way that confederation is similar to
federation. Both are equally asymmetrical but in associated statehood,
the federate state is less bound to the
federate power, and the constitution
which binds them usually has provisions for the severance of ties
between the two under certain speciPS: Political Science & Politics

